Summary
Ketju does not approve Kelp (rsETH) on any chain: on 2026-04-18 a forged cross-chain message drained Kelp's Ethereum bridge adapter, because Kelp had cut its bridge's verification to one verifier. The forged packet released 116,500 rsETH, worth about $292M at the time, with no matching burn on the source chain. LayerZero's final report says the application owner had changed a 2-of-2 verification setup to a single 1-of-1 DVN. Compromise of LayerZero's internal RPC infrastructure, plus a denial-of-service attack on a third-party RPC, was then enough. No one exploited the mainnet restaking contracts or the EigenLayer deposits. But the bridge was part of the rsETH product, and its weakest setting decided whether rsETH stayed fully backed. An ecosystem recovery later restored the backing. Kelp retired bridging on 19 networks and left stranded holders a manual, quarterly claims process. The recovery reflects well on Kelp's conduct, and it does not make the original control acceptable.
Review triggers
- Any contract, oracle, interface, bridge or backing impairment during the 24-month observation period before a new review
- Any supported bridge uses a single verifier or single provider, or changes its configuration without an enforced delay that lets holders withdraw first
- Any issued rsETH lacks continuous, independently verifiable backing
- Any unapproved LST, EigenLayer operator, AVS, oracle or cross-chain deployment joins the risk set
- A mainnet withdrawal or market sale at the proposed size exceeds the written time or slippage limit
Facts
- Verdict
- Not approved
- Type
- ETH staking
- Chains examined
- Ethereum
- Reviewed
- Last confirmed