Summary
Ketju does not approve Convex: it adds a reward, governance and contract layer to Curve or Frax positions, and creates no new low-risk source of return. A client would already have to be willing to own those positions. Curve LP deposits stay redeemable through Convex, but the pool's inventory, depeg, liquidity and smart-contract risks remain. CRV converted to cvxCRV works differently. Convex locks that CRV permanently as veCRV and gives the holder a transferable cvxCRV receipt that the protocol never redeems back to CRV. A holder who wants out must sell on the secondary market at whatever price it offers. Locking CVX to vote adds a separate commitment of sixteen epochs. Convex discloses a 3-of-5 multisig with powers over fees, pool management, shutdown and voting, and its own known-issues page documents a complex remaining attack route through a fake gauge and a shutdown. Convex may suit specialists who already underwrite Curve governance. For this advisor diversification sleeve, the extra boost does not justify an irreversible cvxCRV conversion or delegated gauge exposure.
Review triggers
- Any underlying pool or asset lacks its own current approval and a withdrawal test at the proposed size
- cvxCRV trades more than 5% below parity with CRV at the proposed size
- Any live Booster, reward wrapper or admin-controlled component does not match a current audit
- The published fake-gauge and forced-shutdown path loses its thirty-day warning period or gains a shorter route
- A Convex shutdown, Curve pool imbalance or CVX lock stops the client from withdrawing within the written limit
Facts
- Verdict
- Not approved
- Type
- Liquidity pool
- Chains examined
- Ethereum
- Reviewed
- Last confirmed