Rocket Pool outlines proposed Saturn 2 withdrawal, penalty, and economic changes

What happened

Rocket Pool published RPIP-86 as an informational package describing the likely Saturn 2 scope and the draft RPIPs that would implement it. Formal voting had not started and the final package remained subject to pDAO decisions.

What changed

The proposed package would add protocol-level rETH withdrawals backed by validator exits, permissionless challenges and exits for underperforming validators, exit-request and minipool-penalty mechanics, higher megapool bond requirements, lower RPL issuance, and the end of ongoing RPL rewards for node operators.

What did not change

No component had been formally approved or executed. Existing rETH withdrawal, validator-selection, penalty, bond, and RPL issuance mechanics remained operative pending governance and deployment.

Confirmed

• RPIP-86 was in an informal-sentiment and scoping stage; the underlying RPIPs were draft and not yet voted.
• RPIP-71 proposes an rETH withdrawal queue that can trigger validator exits.
• RPIP-71's first phase would have the oDAO select minipools for exit, while a later megapool selection rule remained undecided.
• RPIP-80 proposes penalties for minipools that do not respond to exit requests.
• The package proposes increasing megapool bond requirements, reducing RPL issuance to 2.5%, and ending ongoing RPL rewards for node operators.

Still open

• The final Saturn 2 scope, vote structure, voting outcome, implementation parameters, and deployment date were undecided.
• The pDAO had not selected the final megapool exit criterion.
• The practical interaction between oDAO minipool selection and penalties for failed exit requests requires governance and control review.
• The effects on rETH withdrawal liquidity, operator participation, and protocol economics remain prospective.

What it means for an advisor

• Open a Rocket Pool memo review now because the written criterion covers RPIPs that expand oDAO power over penalties, and the package plausibly links oDAO exit selection to minipool penalties.
• Do not treat the proposed withdrawal queue as available liquidity until governance approval, deployment, and live performance are confirmed.
• Monitor formal votes and executed parameters for withdrawal priority, validator selection, penalty discretion, bond requirements, and RPL economics.