RIA·DeFi
Control Atlas · Chain · reviewed 2026-07-31

Ethereum: who orders transactions?

None — permissionless proposer set

approvedn/aSovereign

Chain control is one layer. It does not determine the safety or suitability of every asset and protocol deployed on the chain.

Control profile

Transaction ordering
None — permissionless proposer set
Escape hatch
n/a — settlement layer, no exit dependency
Upgrade authority
Social consensus + hard fork. No key can change state or seize funds.
Liveness record
No chain halt since the Merge. Finality ~13 minutes. The standing concern is client concentration: Geth held ~50.1% execution-layer share as of Q4 2025, and a supermajority client bug is the one scenario that could finalise a wrong chain. Institutional operators moved toward multi-client stacks through 2026 in response.

Ketju assessment

The baseline against which every other chain is measured, and the only venue where a sovereignty-first mandate is fully honoured. No sequencer, no upgrade key, no operator who can be compelled. The cost is gas — a client with a small position pays materially more here than on an L2, and that trade-off has to be stated plainly rather than solved by quietly routing them to Base.

Observable review triggers

  • Any single execution client exceeding 66% share
  • Any single consensus client exceeding 66% share
  • Finality failure lasting more than 1 hour

These triggers make the judgment monitorable. They are not predictions; each identifies a fact that would revoke or force review of the current assessment.

Advisor implementation questions

  1. Does the client’s thesis require censorship resistance, or primarily low-cost settlement?
  2. Can the client exit without cooperation from the normal transaction-ordering party?
  3. Who can upgrade bridges or contracts, and what delay applies?
  4. Does the asset introduce an issuer weaker than the chain grade?
  5. What evidence will show a halt, censorship event, or governance change?

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