Who controls it
Control assessmentApproved with limits
Stagestage-1
Reviewed2026-07-31
- Transaction ordering
- Centralised: a single sequencer orders more than 99% of transactions
- Escape hatch
- Forced inclusion through the L1 delayed inbox, with a 24-hour forceInclusion threshold. In practice a full self-service withdrawal is slow and costly.
- Upgrade authority
- The DAO and a security council. Admin keys can upgrade bridge contracts on a timeline of about 7 days, as at every other top-5 L2.
- Halts and outages
- The sequencer has had outages. User funds were never at risk, but users could not reach them during the outages.
Ketju assessment
Ketju approves Arbitrum One with limits: it is a Stage 1 rollup with live permissionless fraud proofs, but a single sequencer orders its transactions and admin keys can upgrade its bridge within about 7 days. As of mid-2026 no rollup has reached Stage 2, so no L2 offers more protection than Arbitrum. It still offers less than Ethereum. It suits clients who want yield or tokenised income and value cheap transactions over censorship resistance. It does not suit a client who holds crypto so that no single party can freeze it.
Review triggers
- Fraud proof system disabled or made permissioned
- Force-inclusion delay extended beyond 24 hours
- Security council threshold lowered, or upgrade timelock shortened below 7 days
- Sequencer outage exceeding 6 hours
Each trigger names a fact anyone can observe. If one occurs, Ketju will review the assessment again. None is a forecast.
Questions before use
- Does the client’s thesis require censorship resistance, or primarily low-cost settlement?
- Can the client withdraw without help from the party that normally orders transactions?
- Who can upgrade bridges or contracts, and what delay applies?
- Does the asset introduce an issuer weaker than the chain grade?
- What evidence will show a halt, censorship event, or governance change?