Anubis Chain: who orders transactions?

Who controls it

Transaction ordering

A 45-member Proof-of-Staked-Authority set orders blocks: the top 21 stake-ranked Cabinet validators produce most blocks and 24 Candidates receive a smaller share.

Escape hatch

n/a for the L1. Moving value elsewhere depends on a bridge whose documentation was only a placeholder at review, with no production trust or recovery model.

Upgrade authority

On-chain governance permits any holder of 200 staked DAI to propose, uses a 10% quorum and 50% yes threshold, and provides only a one-day execution timelock after seven days of voting.

Halts and outages

The documentation claims roughly 0.45-second blocks and about one-second fast finality when two-thirds of validators vote, with probabilistic fallback otherwise. Slashing covers double signing, malicious votes and downtime. Those mechanisms support fast operation. They do not address the short governance delay, the unclear operator distribution or the missing bridge recovery specification.

Ketju assessment

Ketju does not approve Anubis Chain: governance can change the rules one day after a vote, and its materials do not show how a holder would withdraw over its bridge. Anubis publishes a plausible PoSA design with open validator creation, stake-ranked elections and slashing. The same official documents say 21 Cabinet validators get most chances to produce blocks. Proposals need 200 DAI and a 10% quorum, and execution can follow after one day. The cross-chain bridge page describes no working mechanism. So the published materials do not show independent validator distribution, lasting notice of upgrades or a tested withdrawal path.

Review triggers

• Governance adopts an enforceable execution timelock of at least 7 days for every non-emergency upgrade
• Independent measurement shows no organization controls one-third of the 45-validator set or bonded stake for 90 consecutive days
• A production bridge specification publishes signer or proof assumptions, recovery authority, contracts, audits, and withdrawal timing
• Any finality interruption lasting more than 1 hour or any undisclosed emergency upgrade opens an immediate review

Each trigger names a fact anyone can observe. If one occurs, Ketju will review the assessment again. None is a forecast.

Questions before use

1. Does the client’s thesis require censorship resistance, or primarily low-cost settlement?
2. Can the client withdraw without help from the party that normally orders transactions?
3. Who can upgrade bridges or contracts, and what delay applies?
4. Does the asset introduce an issuer weaker than the chain grade?
5. What evidence will show a halt, censorship event, or governance change?