Control profile
- Transaction ordering
- A 45-member Proof-of-Staked-Authority set orders blocks: the top 21 stake-ranked Cabinet validators produce most blocks and 24 Candidates receive a smaller share.
- Escape hatch
- n/a for the L1; moving value elsewhere depends on bridge documentation that was only a placeholder at review and did not specify a production trust or recovery model
- Upgrade authority
- On-chain governance permits any holder of 200 staked DAI to propose, uses a 10% quorum and 50% yes threshold, and provides only a one-day execution timelock after seven days of voting.
- Liveness record
- The documentation claims roughly 0.45-second blocks and about one-second fast finality when two-thirds of validators vote, with probabilistic fallback otherwise. Slashing covers double signing, malicious votes and downtime. Those mechanisms support rapid operation but do not cure the short governance delay, unclear operator distribution, or missing bridge recovery specification.
Ketju assessment
REJECTED for a one-day rule-change window and incomplete exit evidence. Anubis publishes a plausible PoSA design with open validator creation, stake-ranked elections and slashing; those are positives. The same official corpus says 21 Cabinet validators receive most production opportunities, permits proposals with 200 DAI and 10% quorum, and allows execution after only one day. Its cross-chain bridge page contains no operative mechanism. The published materials therefore do not establish independent validator distribution, durable upgrade notice, or a tested exit path.
Observable review triggers
- Governance adopts an enforceable execution timelock of at least 7 days for every non-emergency upgrade
- Independent measurement shows no organization controls one-third of the 45-validator set or bonded stake for 90 consecutive days
- A production bridge specification publishes signer or proof assumptions, recovery authority, contracts, audits, and withdrawal timing
- Any finality interruption lasting more than 1 hour or any undisclosed emergency upgrade opens an immediate review
These triggers make the judgment monitorable. They are not predictions; each identifies a fact that would revoke or force review of the current assessment.
Advisor implementation questions
- Does the client’s thesis require censorship resistance, or primarily low-cost settlement?
- Can the client exit without cooperation from the normal transaction-ordering party?
- Who can upgrade bridges or contracts, and what delay applies?
- Does the asset introduce an issuer weaker than the chain grade?
- What evidence will show a halt, censorship event, or governance change?
Research sources
- Anubis Chain Documentation — Introduction — 45-validator PoSA, Cabinet and Candidates, block time, fast finality
- Anubis Chain Documentation — Staking overview — validator election, 2,000 DAI self-delegation, slashing, daily ranking
- Anubis Chain Documentation — Governance overview — proposal threshold, 10% quorum, seven-day voting, one-day timelock
- Anubis Chain Documentation — Cross-chain bridge — absence of operative bridge mechanism and recovery disclosure
Sources were accessed 2026-08-19. Primary documents and measured control conditions can change; the review triggers above govern off-cycle reassessment.