# Aave’s guardians began reopening markets with collateral restrictions after the October 29 freeze.

> LlamaRisk’s October 30 update confirmed that guardians had unfrozen the affected Aave V3 reserves while retaining zero loan-to-value ratios.

- URL: https://riadefi.com/on-chain/2026-10-30-aave-binance-response/
- Type: Control change
- Stage: Executed
- Evidence: confirmed
- Materiality: critical
- Event date: 2026-10-30
- Version: 1, published 2026-10-31 (first published 2026-10-31)
- Follow-up: 2026-11-01
- Advisor-relevant: yes
- Affects: Aave v3 (protocol)

## What happened

LlamaRisk reported that Aave’s guardians froze reserves on October 29, 2026, after an address associated with the Binance incident borrowed WETH.

## What changed

LlamaRisk’s October 30 update confirmed that guardians had unfrozen the affected Aave V3 reserves while retaining zero loan-to-value ratios.

## What did not change

LlamaRisk stated that users could withdraw and repay during the freeze, while liquidators could continue liquidations. Existing Aave V3 liquidation thresholds remained unchanged.

## Confirmed

- LlamaRisk reported that guardians froze 175 Aave V3 reserves across 16 networks between 21:42 and 23:04 UTC on October 29.
- LlamaRisk reported that an associated address supplied 60M USDT and borrowed 19,762 WETH before the freeze.
- LlamaRisk reported executing temporary interest-rate reductions and borrowing-limit reductions on October 30.
- LlamaRisk attributed about $3.7B of removed unused Aave V3 borrowing capacity to the reductions.
- LlamaRisk stated that USDT, USDC, USDT0, POL, WAVAX, sAVAX, XAUt, PAXG and OP would retain zero loan-to-value ratios.
- LlamaRisk stated that these restrictions also covered the listed assets’ bridged and wrapped versions and Aave V3 E-Mode.

## Still open

- LlamaRisk’s update did not confirm completion of every reopening stage.
- The update stated that GHO borrowing-limit reductions on Ethereum Core and Prime remained queued with the GHO Stewards.
- LlamaRisk’s summary targeted 10.00% APR at full utilization, but the separate parameter notice listed higher rates for several reserves.
- Binance’s total losses, recovery and incident cause require separate primary confirmation.

## What it means for an advisor

- Ketju should reopen the Aave memo to verify current GHO borrowing limits, supplier liquidity and restrictions affecting collateral.
- Ketju’s approval covers Ethereum GHO and sGHO, so advisors should verify those exposures separately from other Aave markets.
- Advisors should verify current borrowing power before relying on affected collateral to support additional debt.

## Sources

1. [Binance Hot Wallet Exploit: Aave's Response](https://governance.aave.com/t/binance-hot-wallet-exploit-aaves-response/25954) · LlamaRisk, Aave risk service provider · 2026-10-30


---

Published by Ketju Research on RIADeFi (https://riadefi.com). Educational research for financial professionals; not investment, legal, tax, or compliance advice.